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Sharp Curves Ahead: Analyzing Dedications to
Public Use in Louisiana after Webb v. Franks
Investment Co.
INTRODUCTION
One hundred years ago, your ancestor-in-title granted to the
parish government a narrow strip of land that bisected his property
so that a public highway could be constructed. To this end, he
executed a simple yet ambiguous document, which stated: “I
hereby dedicate this land to the public use for a public road. This
property is to be used for public road purposes only.” Years later,
after acquiring the property from your ancestor-in-title, you decide
to sell the land but retain the mineral rights. Mineral production
has been continuous on the land since you retained the mineral
rights but only on one side of the highway. After ten years, the
surface owner of the land challenges your rights to the minerals on
the dormant side of the highway, claiming that part of your mineral
servitude has prescribed through non-use. He argues that your
ancestor-in-title’s century-old document transferred ownership of
the narrow strip of land to the government, creating two separate
estates and therefore two separate servitudes separated by the
highway.1 As such, the mineral operations on one side of the
highway would not interrupt prescription on the other side.
These were the facts considered by the Louisiana Second
Circuit Court of Appeal in Webb v. Franks Investment Co.2
Unfortunately, the existing law is rather unclear with respect to
these types of transfers of property, known as “formal” dedications
to public use, and the Second Circuit did little to clarify the law.
The court ultimately decided that the dedication conveyed a
servitude, but the three conflicting opinions from the panel reveal
the state of confusion that plagues the law of dedication.3
Dedication to public use has been defined as “the act of
appropriating private land to the public for any general or public
use.”4 After land has been dedicated, the “dedicator” cannot

Copyright 2015, by BEN JUMONVILLE.
1. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:73 (2000) (“A single mineral servitude
may not be created on two or more noncontiguous tracts of land.”).
2. See Webb v. Franks Inv. Co., 105 So. 3d 764 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
3. Id. at 771.
4. William G. Bredthauer & Shawna Snellgrove Rinehart, Ownership and
Leasing of Minerals Under Highways and Right-of-Ways, 16 TEX. WESLEYAN
L. REV. 3, 6 (2009) (quoting Scott v. Cannon, 959 S.W.2d 712, 718 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1998)).
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interfere with the public’s right to full enjoyment of the land.5
Because dedications are typically gratuitous transactions, they are
often analogized to gifts or donations.6
In Louisiana, dedication to public use is not identified by the
Civil Code as a method by which landowners may transfer an
interest in their properties.7 In fact, there is relatively little
legislative guidance on dedications to public use.8 Nevertheless,
over the course of almost two centuries, Louisiana courts have
developed a substantial body of jurisprudence on the subject.9 In
this jurisprudence, the courts have identified different methods or
“modes” by which a dedication may be executed, with each mode
having unique requirements and effects.10 Currently, Louisiana
recognizes four distinct modes of dedication: statutory, tacit,
implied, and formal.11
Formal dedication is the most unsettled of the four modes of
dedication. Recognized by Louisiana courts only 30 years ago,
formal dedication is defined as a dedication executed by a written
act.12 In particular, one critical question regarding the law on
formal dedications remains unanswered: What type of property
right is transferred to the public?13 Whereas some courts have
strongly adhered to the principle that formal dedications vest
ownership in the public absent express intent to the contrary,14
other courts have expressly stated and implied the opposite
principle—that a statement of dedication must specifically contain
an intent to convey ownership in order to actually convey
ownership to the public.15 Because dedication disputes affect the
ownership of valuable real estate, Louisiana courts need to agree
5. Id.
6. See Note, Public Ownership of Land Through Dedication, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 1406, 1406 (1962).
7. See A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 95, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 208 (4th ed. 2001).
8. See St. Charles Parish Sch. Bd. v. P & L Inv. Corp., 674 So. 2d 218, 221
(La. 1996) (citing Garrett v. Pioneer Prod. Corp., 390 So. 2d 851, 854 (La.
1980)).
9. See infra Part I.
10. St. Charles, 674 So. 2d at 221.
11. Id.
12. The first case to explicitly recognize formal dedication was Anderson v.
Police Jury of E. Feliciana Parish, 452 So. 2d 730 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
13. See infra Part I.
14. See, e.g., Anderson, 452 So. 2d at 730; Schmit v. St. Bernard Parish
Police Jury, 504 So. 2d 619, 622 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Anderson, 452 So.
2d 730).
15. See, e.g., S. Amusement Co., Inc. v. Pat’s of Henderson Seafood &
Steak, Inc., 871 So. 2d 630 (La. App. Ct. 2004); Webb v. Franks Inv. Co., 105
So. 3d 764, 769–70 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
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on a framework that will produce a consistent and predictable body
of law.
Part of this problem is rooted in Louisiana’s history. Prior to
the development of the oil and gas industry in Louisiana, the
question of public ownership of dedicated lands received far less
jurisprudential treatment since courts were only concerned with
whether the surface of the property was subject to public use.16
Another source of this problem is the failure of Louisiana courts to
follow a uniform framework for interpreting the language of
dedication documents. Although the Louisiana Supreme Court
suggested that formal dedications presumptively transfer ownership
to the public in the 1996 case of St. Charles Parish School Board v.
P & L Investment Corp.,17 some of the lower courts have since
ignored the Supreme Court’s guidance, resulting in a confusing
legal landscape.18
This Note argues that the majority in Webb v. Franks
Investment Co. applied an incorrect standard for determining when
formal dedications transfer ownership.19 Part I traces the history of
dedication law in Louisiana, highlighting the varying, inconsistent
approaches taken by Louisiana courts. Part II discusses the Webb
decision and sets forth the arguments in Webb’s majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part III critiques the Webb
majority’s departure from the view of most Louisiana courts that
formal dedications, unless stated otherwise, transfer ownership and
explores the opinion’s troubling effects on dedication law in
Louisiana. Finally, Part IV suggests that courts should stop
deviating from the rule laid down by the Louisiana Supreme Court
in St. Charles Parish School Board v. P & L Investment Corp. and
apply a presumption that formal dedications transfer ownership.
By doing so, this approach would be consistent with the principles
and rules governing dedication in Louisiana and would reflect the
original purpose behind the jurisprudential creation of formal
dedication—the recognition of a mode of dedication that transfers
ownership.

16. See Garrett v. Pioneer Prod. Corp., 390 So. 2d 851, 855 (La. 1980).
17. St. Charles Parish Sch. Bd. v. P & L Inv. Corp., 674 So. 2d 218, 221
(La. 1996).
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part III.
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I. A WINDING ROAD: THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEDICATION
LAW IN LOUISIANA
Louisiana’s jurisprudence on dedication to public use dates
back 200 years, a period throughout which the courts have
approached dedications in a myriad of ways.20 Although Louisiana
courts first applied civil law principles to dedication issues, the
courts have taken a decidedly common law approach to dedication
over the last century and a half, crafting an intricate body of case
law on the subject. The most notable aspect of this progression is
how the courts have carved out four distinct methods by which a
dedication can operate. This Part examines the development of this
area of the law, emphasizing the courts’ erratic treatment of formal
dedications over the last 30 years.
A. Civil Law Origins
The earliest cases concerning dedication in Louisiana
consistently held that the public owned the roadbeds and other
public property, regardless of how the land was acquired.21 These
decisions were heavily influenced by civilian principles, with cases
citing to Roman, French, and Spanish laws as conclusive
authority.22 For instance, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s 1816
decision in Renthorp v. Bourg held that a Roman law providing
that the soil of a highway was public property applied in
Louisiana.23 As one scholar noted, two concepts were predominant
in the early cases: “(1) public things [were] owned by the public;
and (2) one who designate[d] [lands] as ‘public’ [did] by that act of
dedication alone create public ownership of the dedicated lands.”24
This civilian notion of public ownership of public things did
not last long in Louisiana, however. In 1848, the Louisiana
Supreme Court limited Renthorp’s application of the ancient
Roman law doctrine in Hatch v. Arnault, finding that the roads in
the “infant colony” of Louisiana were simply not comparable to
the ancient Roman highways that were “as permanent as the labor
20. See Renthorp v. Bourg, 4 Mart. (o.s.) 97 (La. 1816).
21. Garrett, 390 So. 2d at 855. For an extensive history of the development
of dedication in Louisiana, see Michael G. Page, Comment, The Third
Dimension of Dedication in Louisiana, 30 LA. L. REV. 583 (1970).
22. See Renthorp, 4 Mart. (o.s.) at 97; Mayor of New Orleans v. Gravier, 11
Mart. (o.s.) 620 (La. 1822); Morgan v. Livingston, 6 Mart. (o.s.) 19 (La. 1819);
City of New Orleans v. Metzinger, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 296 (La. 1814).
23. Renthorp, 4 Mart. (o.s.) at 138.
24. Page, supra note 21, at 600 (emphasis added).
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of man could make them.”25 Relying on article 654 of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 and borrowing from French doctrine,
the court ruled that Louisiana roads were generally classified as
“chemins publics,” or public roads that were privately owned
subject to a servitude of use in favor of the public.26 Nevertheless,
the court did acknowledge that a few Louisiana highways were
classified as “grand chemins,” or roads wholly owned by the
public.27 But, in the years that followed, these early civil law
influences were eventually completely displaced by common law
principles.28
B. Common Law Influences
In 1832, the United States Supreme Court set forth the
common law requirements of dedication in City of Cincinnati v.
White’s Lessee.29 The White’s Lessee Court held that there is no
particular form or ceremony necessary to effect a dedication and
that “all that is required is the assent of the owner of the land, and
the fact of its being used for the public purposes intended by the
appropriation.”30 In 1841, the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the
common law principles of dedication found in the White’s Lessee
case.31 This decision, whether intentionally or inadvertently,32
effectively displaced civilian principles with common law rules; for
the next century, Louisiana courts often relied on the principles
espoused by the United States Supreme Court in White’s Lessee and
endorsed by the Louisiana Supreme Court.33 Today, the description
25. Hatch v. Arnault, 3 La. Ann. 482, 485 (1848). See also Harry McCall,
Jr., Comment, The Effect of Dedication to Public Use in Louisiana, 13 TUL. L.
REV. 606, 611–12 (1939).
26. Hatch, 3 La. Ann. at 487.
27. Id. at 488–89.
28. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Common, Public, and Private Things in Louisiana:
Civilian Tradition and Modern Practice, 21 LA. L. REV. 697, 733–34 (1961).
29. See 31 U.S. 431 (1832).
30. Id. at 440.
31. Municipality No. 2 v. Orleans Cotton Press, 18 La. 122 (La. 1841). See
Yiannopoulos, supra note 28, at 733–34.
32. Just eight years earlier, the Louisiana Supreme Court in De Armas v.
City of New Orleans, 5 La. 132 (La. 1833), specifically rejected the common
law principles of dedication as being inconsistent with the controlling French
and Spanish jurisprudence in Louisiana. Nevertheless, the Orleans Cotton Press
court, seemingly by mistake, cited the dissenting opinion in De Armas (the
dissenting opinion happened to be delivered first) for the proposition that the
law of dedication was governed by White’s Lesee. See Yiannopoulos, supra note
28, at 733 n.174.
33. See, e.g., Pickett v. Brown, 18 La. Ann. 560 (1866); Saulet v. City of
New Orleans, 10 La. Ann. 81 (1855); see also Page, supra note 21, at 591–92.
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of dedication in White’s Lessee closely resembles the mode of
“implied dedication” that is recognized by Louisiana courts.34
The Louisiana Legislature’s earliest use of the term “dedication”
is found in Act 134 of 1896.35 The legislation required a subdivider
to file a detailed plat of the land to be subdivided, clearly
demarcating the individual lots, streets, and alleys.36 The subdivider
was also required to include a formal statement dedicating to public
use all of the streets, alleys, and public squares depicted within the
plat.37 The 1896 Act did not, however, address the nature of the
interest acquired by the public, leaving the question for the courts to
decide.38 Today, Act 134 is now substantially embodied in the
section of the Louisiana Revised Statutes that provides for statutory
dedication.39 Moreover, it is now well settled that a statutory
dedication transfers ownership of the property to the public unless
the landowner clearly reserves ownership of the underlying land in
the formal statement of dedication.40
The most significant development in Louisiana’s dedication law
was the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Arkansas-Louisiana
Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co.41 The Parker court took the opportunity
to clearly outline the law concerning dedication in Louisiana, and
it did so by largely adopting the common law rules of dedication.42
Relying heavily on the language of the Corpus Juris Secundum,
the Parker court held that there were two forms of dedication in
Louisiana: statutory dedication and common law dedication.43 The
34. The Louisiana Supreme Court described implied dedication as:
Implied dedication is a common law doctrine recognized by the courts of
this state. A dedication by implication consists of the assent of the owner,
use by the public, and maintenance by the municipality. Because implied
dedication lacks the formalities and safeguards of formal or statutory
dedication, courts have required “a plain and positive intention to give
and one equally plain to accept.” Courts have also found an implied
dedication when the owner of a tract of land subdivides it into lots,
designates streets or roads on a map, and then sells the property or any
portion of it with reference to the map. An implied dedication
establishes a servitude of public use.
St. Charles Parish Sch. Bd. v. P & L Inv. Corp., 674 So. 2d 218, 222 (La. 1996)
(citations omitted).
35. Webb v. Franks Inv. Co., 105 So. 3d 764, 774 (La. Ct. App. 2012)
(Caraway, J., concurring).
36. Garrett v. Pioneer Prod. Corp., 390 So. 2d 851, 853 (La. 1980).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 854.
39. Page, supra note 21, at 601.
40. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 7, § 99, at 219.
41. See Ark.-La. Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 183 So. 229 (La. 1938).
42. Page, supra note 21, at 585.
43. See Parker, 183 So. at 240.
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court described statutory dedication—dedications made pursuant to
Act 134—as conveying ownership of the property in the public and
not requiring an acceptance by the public to complete the
dedication.44 On the other hand, the court described common law
dedication as operating under an estoppel theory and only
transferring an easement, not an ownership right, in favor of the
public.45 Moreover, the court stated that the public must accept a
common law dedication in order for the dedication to become
effective.46
C. Development of Modern Formal Dedication Law
In the following decades, courts and legal scholars regarded
Parker as the leading authority on dedication in Louisiana.47
Courts often cited Parker for the principle that two exclusive
methods of dedication were recognized in Louisiana.48 These
courts consistently reiterated the rules of dedication recounted in
Parker—statutory dedication transfers ownership while common
law dedication transfers a servitude.49 Despite the widespread
reliance on Parker, Louisiana courts eventually began to discover
that some dedications could be executed in ways other than those
described in Parker.50 For example, Banta v. Federal Land Bank of
New Orleans contains a good example of a dedication that did not
squarely fall within the Parker framework.51 In Banta, a landowner
divided his land into large tracts of 40 to 100 acres and
subsequently filed a plat of the area, describing the roads depicted
within the plat as “public roads.”52 However, the Banta court
determined that Act 134 of 1896 was not intended to apply to the
subdivision of large lots, ruling out the possibility of statutory
dedication.53 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the
inapplicability of statutory dedication did not preclude the
possibility of another form of dedication transferring ownership to
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Thomas D. Hardeman, Comment, Dedication of Land to Public
Use, 16 LA. L. REV. 789, 791 (1956).
48. See, e.g., Life v. Griffith, 197 So. 646, 647 (La. Ct. App. 1940); Village
of Folsom v. Alford, 204 So. 2d 100, 103–04 (La. Ct. App. 1967).
49. See Griffith, 197 So. at 646; Alford, 204 So. 2d at 100.
50. See Banta v. Fed. Land Bank of New Orleans, 200 So. 2d 107 (La. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 202 So. 2d 657 (La. 1967); see also Chevron Oil Co. v.
Wilson, 226 So. 2d 774 (La. Ct. App. 1969).
51. Banta, 200 So. 2d at 111–12.
52. Id. at 108.
53. Id. at 112.
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the public.54 Thus, the court decided that title to the dedicated land
had vested in the public, despite the fact that the dedication was
not made pursuant to Act 134—a holding that clearly contradicted
the concrete framework of Parker, which provided that only
statutory dedication could transfer ownership.55
After Banta, scholar Michael Page noted that courts were
implicitly recognizing a third form of dedication outside of the
Parker framework—a “formal non-statutory dedication”—and
called for its explicit recognition in the jurisprudence.56 Basing his
thesis largely on the civil law origins of dedication favoring public
ownership, Page suggested that this third form of dedication should
vest ownership of dedicated lands in the public.57 One year later,
Professor Yiannopoulos approvingly cited Page’s article and
reiterated the notion that formal, non-statutory dedications should
be recognized so as to vest ownership of the land in the public.58
The assertion that Parker failed to recognize this third form of
dedication was largely ignored until 1980 when the Third Circuit,
and subsequently the Louisiana Supreme Court, addressed the
issue in Garrett v. Pioneer Production Corp.59 In a footnote, the
Supreme Court impliedly recognized that a formal, non-statutory
dedication could exist,60 but it declined to rule on the issue because
the case could be resolved under statutory dedication.61
In 1984, the First Circuit in Anderson v. Police Jury of East
Feliciana Parish became the first court to explicitly recognize
formal dedication as a distinct mode of dedication.62 Relying on
the decisions in both Banta and Garrett as well as Michael Page’s
article, the court found that there were three distinct forms of
dedication: statutory, formal, and informal.63 The court described
formal dedication as “some formal, express act by the owner which
clearly shows an intent to dedicate. . . . [A]bsent a clear expression
to the contrary, this dedication also conveys ownership and applies
54. Id. at 112–13.
55. Id. For an in-depth discussion of the importance of Banta in the
jurisprudence on dedication, see Page, supra note 21.
56. Page, supra note 21, at 587.
57. Id. at 602–03.
58. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Private Law: Property, 31 LA. L. REV. 196, 201
n.24 (1971).
59. See Garrett v. Pioneer Prod. Corp., 390 So. 2d 851 (La. 1980).
60. See id. at 857 n.6.
61. Id. at 857–58.
62. See Anderson v. Police Jury of E. Feliciana Parish, 452 So. 2d 730, 734
(La. Ct. App. 1984).
63. See id. In a footnote, the court noted that Professor Yiannopoulos had
divided “informal” dedication into two distinct modes—“implied” and “tacit”—
resulting in a total of four modes of dedication. Id. at 734 n.2.
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to the situation in which [the statutory dedication requirements are]
not substantially complied with.”64 Three years later, the Fourth
Circuit in Schmit v. St. Bernard Parish Police Jury significantly
strengthened the doctrine of formal dedication as a distinct mode
of dedication.65 Importantly, the Schmit court relied heavily on the
language in Anderson concerning formal dedications, stating that
“[a]ny formal express act by the owner which shows an intent to
dedicate will suffice and ownership is conveyed.”66
D. The Current State of Formal Dedications
Despite the rulings in Anderson and Schmit, some courts
continued to cite Parker for its proposition that Louisiana
jurisprudence recognized only two forms of dedication.67 This
inconsistency ended when the Louisiana Supreme Court decided St.
Charles Parish School Board v. P & L Investment Corp.68 The court
declared that Louisiana recognizes four modes of dedication:
statutory, formal, implied, and tacit.69 With respect to formal
dedication, the court laid out the requirements as follows, heavily
relying on Professor Yiannopoulos’s description of formal
dedication in his treatise on property:
A landowner may make a formal dedication of a road by
virtue of a written act, such as a deed of conveyance to the
police jury of the parish. The written act may be in notarial
form or under private signature. A formal dedication
transfers ownership of the property to the public unless it is
expressly or impliedly retained. If the landowner retains
ownership of the property, the public acquires a servitude
of public use.70
The St. Charles decision effectively superseded Parker as the
fountainhead authority on dedication in Louisiana and remains
good law today regarding its holding on dedications to public

64. Id. at 734.
65. See Schmit v. St. Bernard Parish Police Jury, 504 So. 2d 619 (La. Ct.
App. 4th 1987).
66. Id. at 622.
67. See, e.g., Hailey v. Panno, 472 So. 2d 97,100 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
68. See St. Charles Parish Sch. Bd. v. P & L Inv. Corp., 674 So. 2d 218 (La.
1996).
69. Id. at 221. The court adopted Professor Yiannopoulos’s approach to the
doctrine, dividing “informal dedication” described in Anderson into two separate
modes of dedication: “implied” and “tacit.” Id.
70. Id. (citations omitted).
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use.71 Although the court did not address formal dedication at
length, the language of the opinion reflected the court’s desire to
follow the legal scholars and lower courts by holding that an
instrument of formal dedication should transfer ownership to the
public as a default rule unless the dedicatory language displays an
intent to retain ownership.72
The pro-ownership approach taken by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in St. Charles received its strongest endorsement in the
Third Circuit’s 2000 decision of Vernon Parish Police Jury v.
Buckley.73 The Buckley court was charged with interpreting an
instrument that was executed in 1983 and purported to convey a
50-foot “right-of-way” in favor of the public.74 The court briefly
cited the language regarding formal dedication found in St. Charles
and concluded that the dedication transferred ownership of the
road, finding no reservation of ownership in the instrument.75
Although Buckley followed the Louisiana Supreme Court’s clear
language favoring transfers of ownership, the St. Charles rule has
become the subject of mixed observance by the lower courts.
Eight years after the Louisiana Supreme Court clarified the
modern rule on formal dedication in St. Charles, the Third Circuit
distinguished the rule in the 2004 decision of Southern Amusement
Co. v. Pat’s of Henderson Seafood & Steak, Inc.76 In Southern
Amusement, the court was asked to interpret the following dedicatory
language: “As a part of the consideration for this sale, Vendor and
Vendee hereby dedicate to the City . . . all road rights-of-way shown
in the attached plat of survey dated June 7, 1977 . . . .”77 A notation on
the attached survey reiterated the dedication as follows: “Vendor
and Vendee hereby dedicates [sic] for public use all Right of Ways
for roads and streets as shown above.”78
Reasoning that the use of the term “right-of-way” in the
dedicatory language sufficiently demonstrated the dedicator’s
intent to retain ownership, the court determined that this language
71. St. Charles has since been abrogated on other grounds by Cenac v.
Public Access Water Rights Ass’n., 851 So. 2d. 1006 (La. 2003).
72. See St. Charles, 674 So. 2d at 221.
73. See Vernon Parish Police Jury v. Buckley, 776 So. 2d 17 (La. Ct. App.
2000).
74. Id. at 18. The exact dedicatory language of the act did not appear in the
court’s opinion, but the court described the document as transferring a “right of
way.” Id.
75. Id. at 20–21.
76. See S. Amusement Co., Inc. v. Pat’s of Henderson Seafood & Steak,
Inc., 871 So. 2d 630 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
77. Id. at 631.
78. Id.
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dedicated only a servitude in favor of the public.79 This argument
was derived from the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “rightof-way,” which says that the term connotes the transfer of only an
“easement,” the common law equivalent of servitude.80 The court
went on to suggest that had the words “right-of-way” not been
used in the dedicatory language, the outcome might have been
different.81
Although the above reasoning is consistent with the St. Charles
framework to the extent that the phrase “right-of-way” can be
considered an implied retention of ownership, the Southern
Amusement court eventually deviated from the St. Charles rule. In
the course of its reasoning, the court stated that, “[a]s noted by
Professor Yiannopoulos, there must be a clear intent to dedicate
and, to that end, there must be a clear dedication of title to the
dedicated property in order to transfer ownership.”82 The second
half of this sentence represents a sharp departure both from the
previous jurisprudence regarding the transfer of ownership in
formal dedications and from the very authority to which the first
half of the sentence refers.83 Prior to this case, modern Louisiana
courts consistently held that formal dedications transfer ownership
as a matter of law unless the dedicatory language evinces an intent
to retain ownership.84 The statement by the Third Circuit turns this
principle on its head, implying that only a servitude is presumed to
be conveyed. Thus, according to the Third Circuit in Southern
Amusement, a formal dedication transfers only a servitude unless
the declaration clearly expresses a conveyance of ownership as
well.

79. Id. at 637.
80. Interestingly, the court chose to refer to Black’s Law Dictionary instead
of the Louisiana jurisprudence, which has discussed this issue many times. See
A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 8:8, in 3 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 537–38 (5th ed. 2011). Louisiana courts have held that, while “right
of way” generally implies a servitude, either ownership or a servitude can be
intended by the term. Id.
81. Southern Amusement, 871 So. 2d at 637.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. The court is referring to Professor Yiannopoulos’s work on formal
dedication, which states that “[i]n a formal dedication, the ownership of the
property is transferred to the public, unless it is expressly or impliedly retained.”
YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 7, § 97, at 213.
84. See, e.g., St. Charles Parish Sch. Bd. v. P & L Inv. Corp., 674 So. 2d
218, 221 (La. 1996); Vernon Parish Police Jury v. Buckley, 776 So. 2d 17, 20–
21 (La. Ct. App. 2000); Schmit v. St. Bernard Parish Police Jury, 504 So. 2d
619, 623 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Anderson v. Police Jury of E. Feliciana Parish,
452 So. 2d 730, 734 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
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Notably, the Southern Amusement decision came with a strong
dissent arguing that the formal dedication transferred ownership to
the public.85 Relying heavily on Professor Yiannopoulos’s
statements regarding formal dedication, as well as the First Circuit’s
decision in Anderson, the dissent concluded that “[t]he use of the
word ‘dedicate’ is all that is required . . . to find a formal dedication
occurred and for ownership to transfer to the public.”86 The dissent
predicted that “[t]he majority opinion [would] create havoc with
long established principles of property law.”87
Again, in 2010, the Third Circuit in Clement v. City of Lake
Charles tinkered with the St. Charles rule governing the property
interest transferred by formal dedications.88 Clement involved a
statutory dedication, the dedicatory language of which granted the
“right-of-way of streets” to the public.89 The trial court, relying on
Southern Amusement, found that the use of the term “right-of-way”
in the dedicatory language was sufficient to retain ownership of the
roads, thus granting only a servitude in favor of the public.90 The
Third Circuit reversed, however, holding that the mere use of the term
“right-of-way” in a statutory dedication, unlike a formal dedication,
does not suffice to retain ownership.91 In other words, the court held
that formal dedications require a lower standard for proving intent to
retain ownership than do statutory dedications.
This holding from the Third Circuit effectively distinguished St.
Charles. First, the Clement court declared that a statutory dedication
must “expressly” reserve ownership.92 However, the modifier
“expressly” was not included in the St. Charles opinion. Rather, the
Clement court borrowed this term from a First Circuit opinion.93 The
court then contrasted this “expressly” standard with the language of
St. Charles, which provided that formal dedications can reserve
ownership “expressly or impliedly.”94 The court posited that this
85. Southern Amusement, 871 So. 2d at 640–41 (Cooks, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 641.
87. Id.
88. See Clement v. City of Lake Charles, 52 So. 3d 1054 (La. Ct. App.
2010).
89. Id. at 1056.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1059.
92. Id. at 1058.
93. Id. The First Circuit opinion cited is Stonegate Homeowners Civic Ass’n
v. City of Baton Rouge, 836 So. 2d 440 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
94. Clement, 52 So. 3d at 1058–59 (alteration in original) (quoting S.
Amusement Co., Inc. v. Pat’s of Henderson Seafood & Steak, Inc., 871 So. 2d
630, 635 (La. App. Ct. 2004)). Interestingly enough, the Stonegate court found
that the use of the term “right of way” was an express reservation of ownership.
See 836 So. 2d. at 444 n.4.
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distinction is warranted because formal dedications are voluntary
but statutory dedications are compelled by legislation.95 Because
formal dedications are not compelled by a statute, the court reasoned
that there is a greater need to protect a dedicator from “inadvertent
mistakes.”96 Thus, under Clement, a formal dedication reserves
ownership “without any specific reservation,” but a statutory
dedication must “expressly” reserve ownership.97 Accordingly,
despite interpreting almost identical dedicatory language, the Third
Circuit preserved the ruling in Southern Amusement while reaching
a different outcome in Clement. Such results are indicative of a
jumbled doctrine in need of clarification.
II. VEERING OFF TRACK: THE DECISION OF WEBB V. FRANKS
INVESTMENT CO.
Given the fledgling nature of formal dedication’s existence as a
distinct and identifiable doctrine in Louisiana, every decision that
closely deals with a formal dedication has a formative impact. A
2012 Second Circuit decision, Webb v. Franks Investment Co.,
involved two consolidated cases arising out of disputes over mineral
rights on two separate tracts of land in Caddo Parish.98 In both cases,
a strip of land on each tract was dedicated to the public in the early
1900s for use as a public road.99 Both cases involved a dedication
using a standard form with the pre-printed language, “I . . . do
hereby dedicate to the public use for a public road,” followed by
either a handwritten or typewritten description of the land.100 The
form then provided, “The said property to be used for public road
purposes only.”101
Subsequent to the dedications, both tracts became burdened
with mineral servitudes.102 Following the development of the
Haynesville Shale and subsequent drilling operations on the
properties, large royalty bonuses were at stake.103 The rights to
these lucrative royalties ultimately boiled down to whether the
dedications to the public transferred ownership or merely a
servitude.104 If the public owned the dedicated roadways, then the
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Clement, 52 So. 3d at 1058.
Id.
Id. at 1058–59.
Webb v. Franks Inv. Co., 105 So. 3d 764, 765–66 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at 766.
Id. at 766–67 (alteration in original).
Id. at 767.
Id. at 766.
Id.
Id. at 767.
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roadways dissecting the tracts would serve to divide the tract, thus
creating separate mineral servitudes on each side of the
highway.105 As such, the drilling operations on one side of the
highway would not serve to interrupt prescription on the opposite
side.106 On the other hand, if the public merely enjoyed a servitude
over the roads, then the drilling operations on one side of the
highway would interrupt prescription over the entire tract. No
portions of the properties would be subject to prescription of nonuse, and the mineral servitudes would remain intact.107
After consolidating the two cases, the trial court found that
Caddo Parish owned both roads as a matter of law.108 Applying the
St. Charles rule, the trial court held that ownership transferred to
the public when the dedications were executed because neither
dedication contained language indicating an intent to retain
ownership.109 Ultimately producing three opinions from the panel,
the Second Circuit reversed and remanded on appeal, finding that
the dedications had only transferred a servitude to the public.110
A. Majority Opinion by Judge Brown
The majority began its analysis by citing to a 1939 Louisiana
Supreme Court case, which found that an act of dedication for a
roadway conveyed only a servitude.111 Notably, the language in that
act of dedication used the term “right-of-way” to describe the right
transferred therein—a term that was absent in both acts of dedication
in Webb and which has since been construed by at least one
Louisiana court as an express reservation of ownership.112 Next, the
court relied on a 1942 Louisiana Supreme Court case for the
principle that a right of way may transfer either ownership or a
servitude, but, as a general rule, only a servitude is intended to be
transferred.113 Finally, the court cited to a Second Circuit decision
from 1950 for the proposition that, in determining whether title or a
servitude has been conveyed by a written instrument, the intention of
the parties must be determined from the stipulations in the entire
105. Id. at 766–67.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 766.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 771–72.
111. Id. at 768 (citing Jones Island Realty Co. v. Middendorf, 185 So. 881,
882 (La. 1939)).
112. See Jones Island, 185 So. at 882; see supra note 93.
113. See Webb, 105 So. 3d at 768 (citing Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Ellerbe, 6
So. 2d 556, 557 (La. 1942)).
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instrument.114 From these cases and “other cases involving the point
at issue,” the majority concluded that Louisiana courts have
generally construed the intent of the parties in right-of-way cases to
be to grant a servitude, not ownership.115
The majority opinion then addressed the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s treatment of formal dedication in St. Charles.116 In particular,
the Webb court focused on the following portion of the St. Charles
opinion, which cited Professor Yiannopoulos’s treatise on property:
“A formal dedication transfers ownership of the property to the
public unless it is expressly or impliedly retained.”117 Interpreting
this language, the proponents of public ownership argued that “all
formal dedications are, as a matter of law, conveyances of full
ownership unless some contrary expression of [the] grantor’s intent
is provided.”118 The court, however, expressly disagreed with this
interpretation of St. Charles.119 Rather, the court suggested that this
statement concerning formal dedications must be read together with
Professor Yiannopoulos’s scholarship on rights of way in his
treatise’s section on servitudes.120 There, he stated that “[t]he general
rule is that the conveyance of a right of way is generally meant to be
merely a servitude, unless the deed itself evidences that the parties
intended otherwise.”121 This rule, however, is a complete reversal of
the St. Charles rule.122 Unfortunately, the court offered no advice on
how to reconcile these conflicting rules other than that they should be
“read together.”123
Curiously, despite hinting that St. Charles does not actually
presume that a formal dedication transfers ownership, the court then
approvingly quoted at length from the Third Circuit’s opinion in
Clement.124 Although Clement held that reservations of ownership in
formal dedications need not be as explicit as those in statutory
114. Id. (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Stout, 46 So. 2d 151, 153 (La. Ct. App.
1950)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 769.
117. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Y IANNOPOULOS, supra note 7, § 95,
at 204–05).
118. Id. (quoting St. Charles Parish Sch. Bd. v. P & L Inv. Corp., 674 So. 2d
218, 221 (La. 1996)).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 130, in 4 LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE 378 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL
SERVITUDES] (emphasis added).
122. St. Charles, 674 So. 2d at 221 (holding that a formal dedication transfers
ownership unless there is an intent to retain ownership).
123. Webb, 105 So. 3d at 769.
124. Id. at 770–71.
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dedications, the Clement decision undoubtedly interpreted St.
Charles as presuming that formal dedications transfer ownership.125
Finally, the court supported its central argument by relying on
several factors that purportedly demonstrated the parties’ intent to
only grant the public a servitude over the roads.126 These factors can
be summarized as follows: (1) no compensation was given to the
dedicators, (2) specific limitations were placed on the use of the
property, (3) there was an absence of language conveying title to the
properties, (4) the standard form dedications of this type were
historically treated as servitudes by the Parish, and (5) there is
generally no need for the public ownership of roadbeds because the
public interest is in the use of the roads.127 According to the court,
the intent of the dedications to transfer ownership could be
“comfortably known” from these factors.128
B. Concurring Opinion by Judge Caraway
Although Judge Caraway agreed with the majority’s ultimate
outcome, he wrote a separate concurring opinion, which concluded
that the acts of dedication indeed transferred ownership to the
public.129 The heart of the concurrence was its examination of Act
151 of 1910.130 The Act empowered police juries to set aside the
dedications of all roads previously dedicated to public use.131 The
Act contained a critical provision regarding the ownership of
dedicated property after it is no longer in public use: “That upon such
revocation, the ownership of the soil embraced in such roads, streets,
and alley-ways up to the center line thereof shall revert to the then
present owners of the land contiguous thereto.”132 In other words,
following a period of public use, the Act did not return ownership of
the dedicated property to the original landowner nor did it provide
that such owner’s servient interest was freed from a public
servitude.133 Instead, the Louisiana Legislature chose to place
ownership of the dedicated property with the “then present owners”

125. See supra Part I.D.
126. Webb, 105 So. 3d at 771.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 774 (Caraway, J., concurring) (ultimately deciding that a 1983
Caddo Parish Police Jury resolution effectively restricted the Parish’s interest in
the roads to a servitude).
130. Id. at 774–75.
131. Id. at 774.
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. Id.
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of the adjacent land.134 Judge Caraway concluded that this
“legislative implication” should have given property owners who
dedicated their property fair notice that they were surrendering title
to their property by effecting a dedication.135 In his own words, the
“provision rests on the premise that if the owner uses as his
expression for a land conveyance the specific verb ‘dedicate,’ as
opposed to ‘sell’ or ‘donate,’ his ownership of the land may be
completely conveyed to a public body.”136 In support of this
conclusion, he cited at length from a 1925 Louisiana Supreme Court
case, which also noted the legislative implication of the 1910 Act and
accordingly found that the dedication at issue in the case transferred
ownership.137
Judge Caraway also drew upon the similarity between the formal
nature of the dedications in Webb and the formal statements of
dedication required for statutory dedications.138 He quoted from the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Goree v. Midstates Oil Corp.,
where the court compared tacit dedications to statutory
dedications.139 A tacit dedication operates by application of
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 48:491, which declares that roads
or streets that have been “kept up, maintained, or worked” for three
years by a parish or local government will become public roads.140 In
Goree, the court offered the following explanation as to why a tacit
dedication transfers a servitude whereas a statutory dedication
transfers ownership: “A tacit dedication is one which arises from
silence, inactivity—one arising without express contract or
agreement. A statutory dedication involves some deliberate,
affirmative, active step . . . .”141 Judge Caraway then pointed out that,
similar to a statutory dedication, the dedication forms in Webb were
also a “deliberate” and “active step” made under private signature,
likening the metes-and-bounds description found in the standard
dedication forms to the visual rendering of a subdivision plat.142
Based on this analogy to statutory dedication and the import of the
1910 Act, Judge Caraway believed that the dedications in Webb
transferred complete ownership to the public.

134. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
135. Id. at 775.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 775 (citing Jaenke v. Taylor, 106 So. 711 (La. 1925)).
138. Id. at 775–76.
139. Goree v. Midstates Oil Corp., 18 So. 2d 591, 596 (La. 1944).
140. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48:491 (2004).
141. Webb, 105 So. 3d at 776 (Caraway, J., concurring) (quoting Goree, 18
So. 2d at 596).
142. Id.
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C. Dissenting Opinion by Judge Moore
Judge Moore also concluded that the dedications transferred
ownership to the public. But, unlike the concurring opinion, the
dissent insisted that Caddo Parish remained in full ownership of the
dedicated land.143 His argument primarily relied upon the principle
stated by the Louisiana Supreme Court in St. Charles—that a formal
dedication transfers ownership of the property to the public unless
the dedicatory language expresses an intent to retain ownership.144
He disagreed with the majority’s assertion that the provisions of the
dedication forms that restricted the land to be used for public road
purposes were indicative of an intent to reserve ownership, stating
that “[a] purpose is crucial to the cause of the dedication.”145 The
dissent’s approach ignored the Third Circuit’s deviations in Southern
Amusement and Clement, preferring instead to follow the Louisiana
Supreme Court’s rule in St. Charles.
III. A WRONG TURN: AN ANALYSIS OF THE FLAWED
REASONING IN WEBB
The Second Circuit in Webb embraced the Third Circuit’s
holding that formal dedications require a lower standard for proving
intent to retain ownership than do statutory dedications.
Unfortunately, the Second Circuit’s majority opinion in Webb has
further jumbled dedication law in Louisiana by ignoring the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s treatment of formal dedications and by
considering inappropriate factors for evaluating the intent behind
dedications to public use. As the dissent in Webb put it, the court
appears to have “skirted the law in its zeal to avoid an unpalatable
result.”146
A. Dedication Is a Unique Means of Conveying Property
Judge Caraway pointed out in his concurrence that dedications
are a “special category of conveyance ‘to public use.’”147 Indeed,
as far back as 1928, the Louisiana Supreme Court declared that
“[d]edications to public use . . . are not governed by the strict rules
which apply to private property.”148 The jurisprudential
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 780 (Moore, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 781.
Id. at 780.
Id. at 774 (Caraway, J., concurring).
Anderson v. Thomas, 117 So. 573, 579 (La. 1928).
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development of dedication law in Louisiana reflects the special
position that courts have granted this unique category of
conveyance.149 For instance, consider the fact that Louisiana courts
have not required dedications to be made by authentic act in order
to take effect.150 In a sense, a dedication is a form of donation.151
Under Civil Code article 1541, donations of immovable property
are required to be made by authentic act.152 Nevertheless, because
this form requirement would be cumbersome and discourage
dedications, “Louisiana courts have taken a much broader view of
formal dedication that has no foundation in legislative texts.”153 In
sum, Louisiana courts have consistently relaxed the ordinary rules
governing conveyances of immovable property when dealing with
dedications in order to promote certain public policies.154
The Webb majority’s reasoning clearly reveals that the
dedication forms were evaluated in the context of a private party
transaction.155 Not only does the court rely on cases interpreting
grants between private parties, but it also uses Professor
Yiannopoulos’s statements in his treatise on predial servitudes to
discount the Louisiana Supreme Court’s ruling in St. Charles on
formal dedication.156 However, this section of Professor
Yiannopoulos’s treatise exclusively contemplates instruments
granting rights between private parties. In fact, this part of the
treatise does not cite a single decision that interprets a dedication to
public use.157 Thus, analyzing dedications to the public under the
same standards as transfers between private parties—which are
subject to the strict provisions of the Civil Code—is illogical.
Different sets of rules govern these two types of transactions;
consequently, landowners are likely to use different language in a
dedication to the public than in a transaction between private parties.
Dedication, having appeared in Louisiana jurisprudence for almost
two centuries,158 is a term of art in Louisiana property law. As such,
149. See supra Part I. This policy is not unique to Louisiana. See McCall,
supra note 25, at 606 (“It is fundamental in other jurisdictions that the rules
governing dedications to the public are different from those governing private
grants.”).
150. See St. Charles Parish Sch. Bd. v. P & L Inv. Corp., 674 So. 2d 218, 221
(La. 1996).
151. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 7, § 97, at 211.
152. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1541 (2015).
153. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 7, § 97, at 212.
154. See Page, supra note 21, at 603 (stating that the “policy favoring grants
to the public dispenses with the ordinary rules of conveyance”).
155. See supra Part II.A.
156. Webb v. Franks Inv. Co., 105 So. 3d 764, 769–70 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
157. See YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES, supra note 121, § 130.
158. See supra Part I.
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special consideration should be given to the context in which it is
used. Failure to do so when interpreting dedicatory language
inevitably discredits the true intentions of the dedicator from the
outset.
B. Reliance on the Typical Factors Used to Interpret Transfers
Between Private Parties is Inappropriate
The clearest example of the court’s misplaced reliance on
jurisprudence, nevertheless, is the majority’s considerations of the
five factors used to determine intent.159 Although the court did not
explicitly reference their origin, these factors are borrowed from the
framework that Louisiana courts apply when determining whether a
document conveying a “right-of-way” has transferred ownership or
a servitude.160 However, consideration of these factors has
historically been limited to analyzing documents between private
parties.161 With the exception of Webb, no case in the modern
jurisprudence has undertaken a similar analysis when interpreting a
formal statement of dedication—and with good reason. Reliance on
these factors is wholly inapposite when interpreting dedicatory
language.162

159. The five factors are: (1) that no compensation was given, (2) specific
limitations were placed on the use of the property, (3) there is an absence of
language conveying title of the property, (4) the dedications were historically
treated as servitudes by the Parish, and (5) there is no need for the public
ownership of roadbeds because the public interest is in the use of the roads. See
supra Part II.A.
160. See Porter v. Acadia–Vermillion Irrigation Co., 479 So. 2d 1003 (La.
Ct. App. 1985). The Porter court listed some additional factors which were not
relevant in the Webb case: who paid taxes on the property and whether the grant
was made “in perpetuity” or “forever.” Id. at 1007. Also excluded in Webb was
whether a specific measurement was given to the right of way. Id. The
dedication forms in Webb did include precise measurements of the dedicated
land, which would tend to indicate an intent to transfer ownership. See supra
Part II.
161. See Porter, 479 So. 2d at 1007 (citing Meaux v. Southdown Lands, Inc.,
361 So. 2d 974 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Hebert, 146 So. 2d
530, 532 (La. Ct. App. 1962)).
162. This Note pretermits discussion of consideration of the historical
treatment by the parties. This factor may be useful in interpreting both grants
between private parties and grants to the public; however, this Note takes the
position that consideration of this factor in Webb would be premature because
the clear intent of the parties can be determined from the four corners of the acts
of dedication.
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1. No Compensation and Limitation to Specific Purpose
The most glaring error in the majority’s reasoning is its
position that the lack of compensation paid to the dedicators and
the dedicators’ limitations on the use of the properties for purposes
of a public road indicated an intent to retain ownership in the
dedicated land.163 First, dedications simply do not involve
compensation, regardless of the right transferred to the public. In
fact, the absence of compensation is often considered to be a
defining quality of dedications.164 There does not appear to be one
case in the Louisiana jurisprudence where a landowner has
specifically purported to “dedicate” an interest in his land in
exchange for some form of compensation. This is because a party
would not use the verb “dedicate” if his or her intent was to be
compensated in exchange for the interest in the land. Instead, a
party would most likely frame the transaction in terms of a sale or
other form of conveyance that is typically associated with bilateral
compensation.
Likewise, limiting the purpose for which dedicated property
can be used is also a foundational aspect of dedications.165 As one
court noted while discussing the “fundamental principles” of
dedication, “the most definite form of dedication is by a deed setting
forth the exact purposes for which the land is conveyed.”166 Although
the designation of land for a limited purpose can be helpful in
determining the intent behind conveyances between private parties,
this consideration simply has no place in the interpretation of
dedicatory language. In the context of dedication, a limitation of
use is more indicative of a “conditional donation” rather than an
intent to only transfer a servitude.167 Characterizing common traits
of dedications, such as absence of compensation or the limitation
to a specific purpose, as indicating intent to retain ownership not
only reflects a deep misapplication of the doctrine, but also
effectively transforms almost all formal dedications into transfers
of only a servitude.

163. Webb v. Franks Inv. Co., 105 So. 3d 764, 771 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
164. Regina Nelson Eng, Note, Alabama Law of Dedication and Reservation:
It’s a Good Thing, 10 JONES L. REV. 37, 41 (2006) (“A dedication is the
uncompensated conveyance of land . . . .”).
165. See id.
166. Joyce v. Brothers Realty Co., 127 So. 2d 756, 759 (La. Ct. App. 1961).
167. Louisiana Civil Code article 1556 provides that a donation may be
revoked for the nonfulfillment of a suspensive condition. In the context of
dedication, the limitation of use may serve as a suspensive condition of the
dedication.
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2. Absence of Language Specifically Conveying Title to the
Land
The majority opinion in Webb also claimed that “[t]he fact that
the dedications did not include any language conveying fee title to
the underlying roadbeds is indicative of an intent to retain
ownership.”168 Although this principle can be helpful in interpreting
conveyances between private parties, its consideration is simply
inapplicable in the context of dedications to a public body. The
dedications in Webb were executed at a time when the law regarding
public ownership in public things was uncertain, with some courts
still maintaining that public things were owned by the public as a
matter of law.169 Considering both the jurisprudence and the
legislative implications at the time, a party executing a formal act of
dedication likely believed that title to the land would pass to the
public by the execution of an act of dedication.170 The mere use of
the word “dedicate” was likely understood by the parties to be
sufficient language to transfer title to the public. “Dedication” is a
legal term of art in Louisiana property law, and it must be
interpreted with its historical understanding in mind.
The Second Circuit’s analysis in Webb sets a precarious
precedent because it draws on authority unrelated and contradictory
to the doctrine of dedication in Louisiana. Unfortunately, this
decision encourages the placement of formal dedication in a sort of
middle ground with respect to the type of interest that the public
acquires. For instance, it is well settled that statutory dedications
typically vest ownership in the public, and it is also well settled that
implied and tacit dedications vest only a servitude.171 Formal
dedications, on the other hand, have been subjected to elaborate
interpretations in order to determine whether the intent of the
dedicator was to transfer ownership or a servitude.172 Although
courts often parrot the standard laid out in St. Charles—that a
formal dedication transfers ownership unless it is expressly or

168. Webb, 105 So. 3d at 771.
169. See Kemp v. Town of Independence, 156 So. 56 (La. Ct. App. 1934).
“Under our laws, when a dedication is made, the dedicator is irrevocably
divested of his ownership, and the thing dedicated is out of commerce, and is not
susceptible of private or individual ownership.” Id. at 58. See also supra Part I.
170. Act 134 provided that a dedication of land could result in the permanent
divestiture of one’s title. See Webb, 105 So. 3d at 774–75 (Caraway, J.,
concurring).
171. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 7, § 98, at 217; § 99, at 219; § 100, at 224.
172. See supra Part I.D.
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impliedly retained173—two appellate courts, the Second Circuit and
the Third Circuit, have taken an approach that strips St. Charles of
its intended effect.174 Consequently, depending on a circuit’s
approach, identical dedicatory language has yielded different results
with respect to whether the public or the dedicator owns the land.175
IV. GETTING BACK ON TRACK: A FRAMEWORK FOR CONSISTENT
TREATMENT OF FORMAL DEDICATIONS
In order to provide both clarity and consistency to the doctrine
of formal dedication, courts should presume that a formal dedication
was intended to transfer ownership to the public unless there is clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary. This evidentiary
presumption strengthens the intended effect of the St. Charles rule,
and it would ensure that formal dedications are interpreted no
differently than statutory dedications. Identical treatment of these
two modes of dedication is merited because the reasoning behind the
well-settled rule that statutory dedications transfer ownership is
equally applicable to formal dedication—both modes of dedication
are deliberate actions that require some degree of formality and
precision. Moreover, a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard is
warranted because it would result in more dedications transferring
ownership. This outcome is beneficial for at least two reasons: (1) it
brings the doctrine in line with the reasoning behind the recognition
of formal dedication as a distinct mode of dedication, and (2) it
advances the public policy of title simplicity by achieving consistent
outcomes.
A. The Reasoning Behind the Rule That Statutory Dedications
Generally Transfer Ownership Is Equally Applicable to Formal
Dedications
Aligning the interpretation rules for formal dedications with
those of statutory dedications brings uniformity to the law of
dedication to public use. The rule in the Second and Third Circuits
that formal dedications should be interpreted differently from
statutory dedications unnecessarily complicates an already intricate
173. St. Charles Parish Sch. Bd. v. P & L Inv. Corp., 674 So. 2d 218, 221
(La. 1996).
174. See Webb v. Franks Inv. Co., 105 So. 3d 764, (La. Ct. App. 2012);
Clement v. City of Lake Charles, 52 So. 3d 1054 (La. Ct. App. 2010); S.
Amusement Co., Inc. v. Pat’s of Henderson Seafood & Steak, Inc., 871 So. 2d
630 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
175. Compare Southern Amusement, 871 So. 2d at 630, with Clement, 52 So.
3d at 1054.
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legal framework. First, the argument found in both Clement and
Webb that different treatment is necessary in order to protect
dedicators against “inadvertent mistakes” is questionable at best.176
The courts have uniformly required that formal dedications be
made by a written instrument under private signature or authentic
act.177 When a grantor undertakes this degree of formality to craft a
legally binding document, the risk of inadvertent mistakes is
unlikely. Moreover, because the recipient of a dedication is
necessarily a governmental entity, the likelihood of a dedicator
being swindled or the subject of any unfair dealing is also highly
improbable. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s opinion in St. Charles
is especially persuasive on this issue.178 In justifying the rule that
implied dedications require an acceptance by the public (unlike
formal and statutory dedications), the court stated that “[b]ecause
implied dedication lacks the formalities and safeguards of formal
or statutory dedication, courts have required a plain and positive
intention to give and one equally plain to accept.”179 This language
demonstrates that the court views formal dedication as operating in
the same way as statutory dedication with regard to safeguards
against mistake. As such, formal dedications should not be
interpreted differently than statutory dedications.
Furthermore, on multiple occasions, the Louisiana Supreme
Court has addressed the reasoning behind the rule that statutory
dedication transfers ownership, and these cases reveal that the
reasons behind this rule are equally applicable to formal
dedications.180 In Goree, the court explained why a tacit dedication
transfers a servitude while a statutory dedication transfers
ownership: “A tacit dedication is one which arises from silence,
inactivity—one arising without express contract or agreement. A
statutory dedication involves some deliberate, affirmative, active
step . . . .”181 As Judge Caraway noted in his concurrence in Webb, a
formal dedication is also a “deliberate” and “affirmative” step
because it requires the execution of an act under private signature
or an authentic act as well as a sufficient description of the land to
be dedicated.182 Viewed in this light, there seems to be little basis
176. Clement, 52 So. 3d at 1058; Webb, 105 So. 3d at 770.
177. See, e.g., St. Charles, 674 So. 2d at 221; Webb, 105 So. 3d 764;
Southern Amusement, 871 So. 2d at 630; Clement, 52 So. 3d at 1054.
178. See St. Charles, 674 So. 2d at 218.
179. Id. at 222 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
180. Goree v. Midstates Oil Corp., 18 So. 2d 591, 596 (La. 1944); Richard v.
City of New Orleans, 197 So. 594, 603–04 (La. 1940).
181. Goree, 18 So. 2d at 596.
182. See Webb, 105 So. 3d at 776 (Caraway, J., concurring).
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for differentiating between the interests that the public acquires in
formal and statutory dedications.
A similar analogy can also be drawn by the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s statements in Richard v. City of New Orleans.183 In Richard,
the court explained the reasoning behind the jurisprudential rule that
a statutory dedication transfers ownership to the public:
We think it may be safely asserted that much harm may
result from the retention in remote dedicators of the fee in
narrow strips of land, valueless for many years, because of
their public or quasi-public use which, on the abandonment
of such use, become valuable for private purposes. Certainly
such agreements are likely to be productive of disputes and
litigation.184
Even though the court was addressing statutory dedications that
most likely involved municipal streets, the very same concerns
apply to roads that have been dedicated in rural areas as well.
Rural roads are often abandoned, and, as seen in Webb, the
ownership of strips of rural land can affect the rights to highly
valuable mineral rights.185
Furthermore, the suggestion by the Second and Third Circuits
that St. Charles contemplates a different standard of interpretation
for formal and statutory dedications is simply not supported by the
text of the opinion. Although the court in St. Charles used the
language “expressly or impliedly” to describe how ownership can
be reserved in formal dedication, the court placed no modifiers on
reservation of ownership in statutory dedication.186 The court
simply stated: “A statutory dedication vests ownership in the
public unless the subdivider reserves ownership of streets and
public places and grants the public only a servitude of use.”187
Thus, the court had an opportunity to draw a clear distinction
between formal and statutory dedications in St. Charles, but it
specifically chose not to do so.

183. See Richard, 197 So. at 594.
184. Id. at 603–04.
185. Mark H. Tompkins, Ownership of Roads, Streets, Alleys, Canals,
Railroads, Etc., 42 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 210 (1995) (“Roads lying outside of
corporate limits are often subject to change and abandonment.”); Webb, 105 So.
3d 764.
186. “Expressly,” the modifier used to describe reservations of ownership in
statutory dedications in Clement, was borrowed from another lower court’s
decision, not the text of St. Charles. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
187. St. Charles Parish Sch. Bd. v. P & L Inv. Corp., 674 So. 2d 218, 222
(La. 1996).
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The decision by the court to not distinguish formal and
statutory dedication in this regard should be taken seriously. The
statements of dedication found in statutory dedications are
predictably very similar—if not practically identical—to the
statements found in formal dedications. Why, then, should courts
interpret a dedicatory provision that appears on a subdivision plat
differently from any other dedicatory provision? From a practical
standpoint, tying the interpretation of formal dedications to that of
statutory dedications is beneficial. There are already many cases
interpreting statutory dedications, thus courts would have more
jurisprudence to rely upon when considering formal dedications in
the future.188 This is especially helpful given the relative novelty of
formal dedication as a distinct mode of dedication. To attach
different meanings to identical dedicatory provisions merely
because one provision appears on a subdivision plat is not a sound
policy, and it will result in a confusing and inconsistent body of
law.
B. Formal Dedications Were Distinctly Recognized to Allow for
Transfers of Ownership
Prior to the Anderson case in 1984, courts consistently cited to
Parker for the principle that Louisiana recognized only statutory
dedication (which vests ownership in the public) and implied,
common law dedication (which vests a servitude in the public).189
However, this framework proved problematic in that courts were
sometimes finding that non-statutory dedications were intended to
transfer ownership to the public.190 As a result, formal dedication
was proposed and adopted as a distinct form of dedication in order
to remedy this inconsistency within the Parker framework.191 The
fact that both scholars and courts determined a need for a “new”
mode of dedication illustrates their belief that written instruments
that did not qualify as statutory dedications should still be found to
transfer ownership to the public. If such instruments were to be
commonly interpreted as conveying only a servitude to the public,
there would be no need to carve out a separate mode of dedication
in the jurisprudence—this situation would simply fall into the
188. Judge Moore’s dissenting opinion in Webb clearly makes this point. He
notes that the Second Circuit has already interpreted dedicatory language in an
earlier case very similar to the language at issue in Webb. That case, however,
involved a statutory dedication and therefore was not considered by the majority
opinion. Webb, 105 So. 3d at 780 (Moore, J., dissenting).
189. See supra Part I.
190. See supra Part I.C.
191. See supra Part I.
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former category of common law dedication.192 However, courts
decided to expand the limiting framework of Parker.193 Thus, to
adhere to the underlying purpose behind the recognition of formal
dedication as a distinct mode of dedication, formal dedications
must be treated as presumptively transferring ownership to the
public.
C. A Clear-and-Convincing-Evidence Standard Advances Public
Policy by Providing Title Simplicity
Lastly, a default rule stipulating that formal dedications
transfer ownership to the public in the absence of clear evidence to
the contrary would promote consistent outcomes and reduce
arbitrary guesswork. Evidentiary presumptions are useful because
they “assist courts in managing circumstances in which direct
proof, for one reason or another, is rendered difficult.”194 As such,
a strong evidentiary presumption is especially warranted where
courts are faced with interpreting documents of formal dedication.
Given the historically inconsistent jurisprudential treatment of
dedication in Louisiana, it is unlikely that courts can actually
discern the true intent behind the document unless the author is
available to testify.195 Furthermore, evidentiary concerns are of
paramount importance when crafting law regarding immovable
property. Due to the high value of real estate, scholars often
suggest that the law relating to land titles requires clearly defined
legal rules that enable people to “know the nature of their rights
and obligations and be able to plan their actions with some
confidence about the legal consequences.”196 Adhering to a clearand-convincing-evidence standard would result in many more
consistent decisions. Instead of courts attempting to employ a wide
range of factors to determine the grantor’s intent, they would be
able to engage in a much more straightforward analysis. For
192. Notably, this is how most common law jurisdictions approach this
problem. See 26 C.J.S. Dedication §§ 15, 16 (1956). In most jurisdictions, a
written document would fall into the category of an “express, common law
dedication.” Id. These documents are interpreted to give effect to the intent of
the parties, but, generally, only a servitude or “easement” is deemed to have
been transferred. Id.
193. See supra Part I.C.
194. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988)
195. See supra Part I.
196. John A. Lovett, On the Principle of Legal Certainty in the Louisiana
Civil Law Tradition: From the Manifesto to the Great Repealing Act and
Beyond, 63 LA. L. REV. 1397, 1397 (2003) (quoting JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN,
THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 48 (2d ed. 1985)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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instance, if the dedicatory language in the Webb case had been
subject to the scrutiny of a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard,
the court likely would have had no trouble concluding that the
dedications vested ownership in the public. The simplicity of this
standard benefits judges, lawyers, and title examiners alike.
CONCLUSION
A look at the recent formal dedication cases in Louisiana
reveals that the law regarding the nature of the interest transferred
by a formal dedication is clearly disorganized. Although the courts
and legal scholars that first addressed this issue clearly favored
vesting ownership of the dedicated property in the public, recent
decisions from some of the lower courts have ignored this
precedent and held that formal dedications presumptively transfer
servitudes. The resulting jurisprudence has thus produced starkly
different outcomes despite interpreting almost identical dedicatory
language. Because there is no legislative foundation for formal
dedication, it is up to the courts to reach a uniform rule. This can
be easily accomplished by requiring a clear-and-convincingevidence standard to rebut the St. Charles presumption that a
formal dedication transfers ownership. This approach is not only
supported by the underlying principles governing the law of
dedication in Louisiana, but it would also bring a swift end to the
confusion surrounding formal dedication.
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